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Abstract  
This article firstly present a systematic overview on national tax regime by classifying China’s 
tax regime into three broad phases in context of underpinning market-oriented institutional 
development during last two decades and, then, in supplement to previous literatures that largely 
stop at provincial level, unveil the complex and obscure local tax regime based on sub-provincial 
field research in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province. The authors observed dual existing tax regimes: 
the hard and standardized state tax regime under central custody versus de facto soft and flexible 
local tax regime under local promotion and argue that despite central persisting initiatives in 
unifying tax regime and recentralization, local variation and divergence continue to play 
indispensable role in implementation of central reform due to China’s sheer size, geographical, 
cultural and resource endowment disparity as well as local state’s self-interest seeking inevitably 
induces localized adaptation of central policy and, consequently, calls for further decentralization. 
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As a historical symbol of new era after Culture Revolution in China, the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee 
adopted a momentous strategy: shifting working focus of the state to revive domestic 
economy and open up to the outside world, which has demonstrated its historical 
significance and far-reaching impact on the world. Since then, China has undergone a 
gradual (not a big bang) institutional transformation from a planning-economy based 
on political authoritarian, state ownership and central planning into a market-economy 
built on representative democracy, private property, market coordination and 
voluntary exchange. Yet, to what extent China has achieved her final objective 
warrants precise assessment and measurement.   
At least, China’s remarkable economic performance with average 8.3 percent of the 
per capita real GDP growth since 1978 and accounting for 25 percent share of global 
economic growth in 1995-20021 attracts numerous economists, political scientists 
and sociologists to trace the reason for China’s success and explore the theoretical 
implication and significance. Among various explanations, the crucial role of de facto 
fiscal and administrative decentralization with compatible incentives for local state to 
foster local economic prosperity becomes pervasive2, which, consequently, prompts a 
comprehensive retrospection and reappraisement of the central-local3 relations in 
                                                        
1 World Bank, Beyond Economic Growth, (Washington: The World Bank, 2000), p.24; The Economist, “China’s 
Economy Steaming”, 15 November 2003, p.71. 
2 See e.g. Jean C. Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China”, 
World Politics, Vol.45, No.1 (1992), pp.99-126; “The Role of the Local States in China’s Transitional Economy", 
The China Quarterly, No.144 (1995), pp.1132-49; Chenggang Xu and Juzhong Zhuang, “Why China Grew: The 
Role of Decentralization”, in Peter Boone, Stanislaw Gomulka, and Richard Layard (ed.), Emerging from 
Communism: Lessons from Russia, China, and Eastern Europe, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); Barry R. Weingast, 
“The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”, 
Journal of Law and Economic Organization, Vol.11 (1995), pp.1-31; Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Barry 
R.Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”, World Politics, 
Vol.48, No.1 (1995), pp.50-81; Yingyi Qian and Barry R.Weingast, “China's Transition to Markets: 
Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style”, Journal of Policy Reform, Vol.1 (1996), pp.149-85; Yingyi Qian 
and Barry R.Weingast, “Federalism As a Commitment to Market Incentives”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol.11, No.4 (1997), pp.83-92. 
3 See e.g. Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, “The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 
1971-1984: The Formal System”, The China Quarterly, No.125 (1991), pp.1-32; Christine P.W. Wong, 
“Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China”, 
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terms of incessant fiscal (tax) reforms.  
As a critical and inherent component of general reform agenda, tax regime 
unavoidably is outcome of political and economic interweaving. This article firstly 
present a systematic overview on national tax regime by classifying China’s tax 
regime into three broad phases in context of underpinning market-oriented 
institutional development during last two decades. Then, in supplement to previous 
literatures that largely stop at provincial level 4 , we probe into the puzzle of 
sub-provincial level5 to unveil the complex and obscure local tax regime based on our 
field research in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province. Our observation shows that two 
separated tax regimes exist: the hard and standardized state tax regime under central 
custody versus de facto soft and flexible local tax regime under local promotion. 
Diversified and divergent practices are undertaken by local government to compete 
for investments and enterprises. Then, an unfavourable result of severe scarcity of 
financial resources, together with biting-off effect on financial revenue from upper 
level jurisdiction, force local government to seek new revenue source and finance 
their soaring expenditure by themselves. Consequently, despite central persisting 
initiatives in unifying tax regime and recentralization, we draw our conclusion that 
local variation and divergence continue to play indispensable role in implementation 
of central reform in that China’s sheer size, geographical, cultural and resource 
endowment disparity as well as local state’s self-interest seeking problem inevitably 
                                                                                                                                                               
The China Quarterly, No.128 (1991), pp.691-715; “Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic 
Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China”, Modern China, Vol.18, No.2 (1992), pp.197-227; (ed.), Financing 
Local Government in the People's Republic of China, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997); Jae Ho Chung, 
“Studies of Central-provincial Relations in People’s Republic of China: A Mid-term Appraisal”, The China 
Quarterly, No.142 (1995), pp.487-580; Albert Park, Scott Rozelle, Christine Wong and Changqing Ren, 
“Distributional Consequences of Reforming Local Public Finance in China”, The China Quarterly, No.147 (1996), 
pp.751-78; Jun Ma, “Modelling Central-local Fiscal Relations in China”, China Economic Review, Vol.6, 
No.1(1995), pp.105-136; Kai-yuen Tsui and Youqiang Wang, “Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal 
Decentralization in China”,  The China Quarterly, No.177 (2004), pp.71-91 . 
4 See footnote 2 and 3. 
5 According to governmental administrative structure, China’s taxation system has five levels. In 2002, below 
the central level are 23 provinces (sheng, including Taiwan), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu), 4 municipalities 
(zhixiashi) and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao), 332 prefectures, 2,860 counties, and 
44,850 townships.  
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induces localized adaptation of central policy (yin di zhi yi) and, consequently, calls 
for further decentralization.  
 
Phase 1: Exploring Market Economy, 1978-1991 
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee convened in 
1978 indicated the commencement of China’s reform aimed at building a powerful 
and modern socialist state by adopting reform and opening-up strategy. Given 
political and ideological constraints, such progress, yet, zigzagged to explore a 
suitable road to economic development. In his opening address on the Twelfth 
National Party Congress in 19826, Deng Xiaoping initially advanced the idea of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Holding the principal of planning 
economy as dominant and market adjustment as supplement became the fundamental 
issue of economic reform at that time7. Two years later, a planned commodity 
economy based on public-owned (yi gongyouzhi wei jichu de you jihua shangpin 
jingji) was scheduled by CCP Central Committee, which stressed market mechanism 
but in a planned way8. While China formulated in the primary stage of socialism on 
the Thirteenth National Party Congress in 1987, market system received more 
endorsement and an enthusiastic urge to promote non-state economy and accelerate 
supportive reforms in various realms of planning, investment, materials and goods, 
finance, banking and foreign trade, etc., was laid out in order to establish the frame 
work of planned commodity economy (jihua shangpin jingji)9. Simultaneously, the 
first amendment to the Constitution was approved in 1988 that permitted the private 
sector to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law10.   
                                                        
6 The Twelfth National Party Congress was convened in Beijing during 1-11September 1982.  
7 See Hu Yaobang’s report on the Twelfth National Party Congress: Quanmian kaichuang shehui zhiyi 
xiandaihua jianshe de xinjumian (Well-rounded initiating a new phase of modernization construction of socialism), 
(1 September 1982). 
8 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jingji tizhi gaige de jueding (Decision of the CCP central committee on 
economic system reform), (20 October 1984). 
9 See Zhao Ziyang’s report on the Thirteenth National Party Congress: Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehui 
zhiyi daolu qianjin (Advance following the road of socialism with Chinese characteristic), (25 October 1987). 
10 See new paragraph added into Article 11 of the Constitution of PRC approved by the Seventh National 
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Responding to the market reform pressed by polity, tax regime caught up with three 
reform stages roughly grouped into 1978-1982, 1983-1984, and 1985-1991. During 
the first stage, in line with opening-up strategy, an independent foreign tax system 
was firstly established to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by promulgating laws 
and regulations in 1980-1982, such as The Income Tax Law of PRC on 
Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures11, The Income Tax Law of PRC on Foreign 
Enterprises 12 , and their detailed rules for implementation, respectively, which 
provided considerable tax reduction or exemption. For instance, a joint venture 
registered for more than 10 years was granted an income tax exemption in the first 
two years after making profit and 50% reduction in the third through fifth year (mian 
er jian san)13. Meanwhile, in view of increasingly foreign employees and their income 
generated within China, the Third Session of Fifth National People’s Congress 
enacted The Individual Income Tax Law14. In 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in 
Guangdong province were designated as Special Economic Zone (SEC) in which 
foreign enterprises and joint ventures enjoyed particular preferential tax policy15. 
Thereafter, 14 economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) were 
established along costal regions in succession16. As for domestic aspect, considering 
feeble rural economy then, numerous measures concerning alleviation of rural tax 
burden were issued to reactivate the domestic economy17. In addition, two new taxes, 
                                                                                                                                                               
People’s Congress on 12 April 1988. 
11 Promulgated by the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on 10 September 1980, and 
annulled on 1 July 1991. 
12 Promulgated by the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on 13 December 1981, and 
annulled on 1 July 1991. 
13 Article 5 of The Income Tax Law of PRC on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures. 
14 Promulgated by the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on 10 September 1980, firstly 
revised on 31 October 1993 and secondly revised on 30 August 1999.  
15 Guangdong sheng jingji tequ tiaoli (Provisions of special economic zone in Guangdong province) (Approved 
by the fifteenth meeting of the Fifth National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 26 August 1980). 
16 From 1984-1988, 14 ETDZs, including Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, 
Nantong, Minhang, Hongqiao, Caohejing, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang had been designated by the 
approval of the State Council.  
17 See e.g. Guanyu jianqing nongcun shuishou fudan wenti de baogao (Report concerning alleviation of rural 
tax burden), (the State Council and Ministry of Finance, 2 December 1978). 
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VAT and special tax on burning oil 18, were levied with intention of expanding tax 
source and economizing oil resource by burning coal. New reforms were also 
introduced into fiscal regime modifying previous centralized system to mobilize local 
government to collect tax. Based on experiment carried out in Jiangsu province in 
1977, which was labeled “fixed rate responsibility” (guding bili baogan) 19, the State 
Council implemented a new fiscal arrangement of “dividing revenue and expenditure 
along each level government with contract” (huafen shouzhi, fenji baogan) in 1980, 
decentralizing fiscal system and increasing autonomy and responsibility of local 
government. Under such system, total fiscal revenues were assigned into three types: 
central fixed revenue, including profit remittance of central SOEs, custom duties; 
local fixed revenue, consisting of salt tax, agriculture tax, animal husbandry tax, 
industrial and commercial income tax, local tax and profit remittance of local SOEs, 
etc.; and revenue shared by central and local, comprising profit remittance of 
central-local SOEs (shared with fixed rate) and industrial and commercial tax (shared 
with adjustment rate)20.   
Two remarkable elements of 1983-1984 stage were two steps of “tax-for-profit” (li 
gai shui) reform for SOEs and extensive reform of existing industrial and commercial 
tax system. In previous system, SOEs completely relied on state’s plan throughout 
enterprise management and subsidies as well as remitted profit, if any, to the state. 
Aimed to empower SOEs independent managerial right and balance responsibility, 
“tax-for-profit” reform intended to replace the profit remittance with tax. The first 
step in 1983 allowed SOEs to retain certain part of profit after income tax while remit 
the surplus to the government. The retainable ratio and income tax rate depended on 
                                                        
18 Special tax on burning oil was levied on 1 July 1982 and abolished on 1 January 1994; VAT on sewing 
machine, bicycle and electric fan were levied on 1 July 1982 with machinery and agricultural machinery added on 
1 January 1983.  
19 See Oksenberg and Tong, “The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984”, 
pp.1-32 for detailed description.  
20 Guowuyuan guanyu shixing “huafen shouzhi, fenji baogan” caizheng guanli tizhi de tongzhi (Circular of the 
State Council concerning implementation of fiscal administrative system of dividing revenue and expenditure 
along each level government with contract), (1 February 1980). 
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enterprises’ size, sectors and ad hoc situation21. In 1984, the second step furthered to 
consider SOE as an independent entity by merely levying tax on it, which, hence, 
triggered adjustments of tax item and levies of five new taxes: resource tax, urban 
maintenance and construction tax, real estate tax, urban and township land usage tax, 
and vehicle and vessel usage tax22.  
As a prelude of tax reform 1994, the 1985-1991 stage was characterized by 
extensive regulations and improvements. To fine-tune the tax regime, the state levied 
around 15 new taxes, abolished one tax, modified two taxes, issued new regulation of 
custom duties23 and unified foreign enterprise income tax with The Income Tax Law 
of PRC on Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises24. After this 
phase of reform, China’s tax regime comprised 37 taxes and 2 national funds (Table 
1).   
[insert table 1 here] 
Phase 2: Establishing Market Economy, 1992-2000 
Although reform pace once was impeded by crackdown of Tiananmen Square at 
home and dramatic changes of Eastern Europe and collapse of the Soviet Union 
abroad, Deng Xiaoping’s inspiring talk during southern scout in 1992 swept off the 
political and ideological obstacle remained in top authorities. Thenceforth, the 
Fourteenth Party Congress took a courageous move by explicitly declaring the target 
of China's economic restructuring was to establish a socialist market economic system 
(shehui zhuyi shichang jingji)25 and avowed the fundamental function of market 
mechanism in economy, which was institutionalised into the Constitution in 1993 and 
199926. With regard to such reform target, a significant document, Decision of the 
                                                        
21 Caizhengbu guanyu guoying qiye li gai shui shixing banfa (Provisional measure of MOF concerning the 
tax-for-profit reform for SOEs), (24 April 1983). 
22 Caizhengbu guanyu guoying qiye dierbu li gai shui shixing banfa (Provisional measure of MOF concerning 
the second stage of tax-for-profit reform for SOEs), (18 September 1984). 
23 Regulation of PRC on Custom Duties, issued by the State Council on 7 March 1985, firstly revised on 12 
September 1987, and secondly revised on 18 March 1992. 
24 Promulgated by the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 9 April 1991. 
25 See Jiang Zemin’s report on the Fourteenth Party Congress, 12 October 1992. 
26 See the second amendment to the Constitution of PRC approved by the Eighth National People’s Congress on 
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CCP Central Committee on Issues Concerning the Establishment of Socialist Market 
Economic System (Decision 1993), outlined a reform package tackling multifaceted 
tasks in 1993, which pointed out to deepen fiscal reform by changing the current 
fiscal contracting system to a tax sharing system on the basis of a rational 
central-local authority division on one hand and improve tax reform adhering to 
principles of unifying tax laws, equalizing tax burden, simplifying tax system and 
rationally decentralizing authority (tongyi shuifa, gongping shuifu, jianhua shuizhi, 
heli fenquan) on the other hand27. Two years later, the Fifth Session of the Fourteenth 
CCP Central Committee announced another document, Suggestion of the CCP 
Central Committee Concerning Establishing the Ninth Five-year Plan of Economic 
and Social Development and 2010 Vision, reemphasising the indispensability and 
urgency of fiscal and tax reform28.   
Due to the essentialness of tax reform 1994, a watershed in China’s tax regime, the 
reform schema was unfolded progressively in prudence, namely pre-1994 preparation, 
1994-1997 interim and 1998-2000 fine-tuning. In the end of 1993, a series of new 
laws, legal amendments, regulations, and measures were approved or issued to 
concretise the objectives in Decision 1993 and prepare for the forthcoming tax reform 
199429. The rationale for such reform is to arrest the national fiscal decline in terms of 
percentage in the gross national product (GNP) and raise the central fiscal revenue in 
terms of percentage in total fiscal revenue as well as strengthen and rationalize state’s 
                                                                                                                                                               
29 March 1993, and the third amendment approved by the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s 
Congress on 15 March 1999. 
27 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli shehui zhiyi zhichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding (Decision of 
the CCP central committee on issues concerning the establishment of a socialist market economic system), 
(Approved by the Third Session of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee, 14 November 1993) 
28 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhiding guoming jingji he shehui fazhan “jiuwu” jihua he 2010 nian yuanjing 
mubiao de jianyi (Suggestion of the CCP central committee concerning establishing the ninth five-year plan of 
economic and social development and 2010 vision), (28 September 1995) 
29 See e.g. Law of PRC on Individual Income Tax, (Revised on 31 October 1993), Rules for Implementation of 
PRC on the Administration of Tax Collection, (Issued on 4 August 1993), Interim Provision of PRC on Business 
Tax, Interim Provision of PRC on VAT, Interim Provision of PRC on Consumption Tax, Interim Provision of PRC 
on Income Tax on Enterprises, Interim Provision of PRC on Land Appreciation Tax, (Issued on 13 December 
1993). 
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macroeconomic control capacity and means. Under 1985 “fiscal contracting system”, 
central government suffered a diminishing share of consolidated fiscal revenue, 
including tax revenue and extra budgetary revenue. As shown in table 2, the share of 
the central government revenue had undergone a continuous shrink during 1985-93, 
which dropped 16.4 percent from 38.4% to 22%. The ratio of total fiscal revenue to 
GDP fell from 22.4% in 1985 to 12.6% in 1993. Aimed to fulfill such objectives, the 
reform package rebuilt the tax regime into 29 taxes30 (Table 3) by extending the 
value-added tax (VAT) to all turnovers, eliminating product tax and adjustment taxes, 
merging minor taxes, ushering new taxes (e.g. consumption tax), unifying income tax 
on domestic enterprises and individual income tax, broadening resource tax, and, 
essentially, introduced the Tax Sharing System (TSS, fen shui zhi)31 under which the 
central government possessed their independent tax base and tax items, such as 
consumption tax (including collected by the customs), customs duties, income tax on 
FIEs and FEs, VAT (collected by the customs) and vehicle acquisition tax while local 
fixed revenues of tax covering business tax, resource tax, urban and township land 
usage tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, occupied farmland tax, real estate 
tax, urban real estate tax, land appreciation tax, vehicle and vessel usage license tax, 
vehicle and vessel usage tax, vessel tonnage tax, deed tax, slaughter tax, banquet tax, 
agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural produce, animal husbandry tax. Fixed rates 
of shared arrangement, whereas, were pre-set on the shared taxes through the 
negotiation between the central and local within a certain period 32(Table 4).  
[insert table 2,3, and 4 here] 
In contrast to pre-1994 during which the tax collection was delegated to local 
government causing a tax-revenue-withholding problem, the 1994 reform set up state 
                                                        
30 In fact, total tax items are 26 not 29 because inheritance tax, security transaction tax and fuel tax are not 
levied yet. 
31 See e.g. Tsang Shu-ki and Cheng Yuk-shing, “China’s Tax Reforms of 1994: Breakthrough or Compromise?”, 
Asian Survey, Vol.34, No.9 (1994), pp.769-88 and Wong, (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's 
Republic of China, for detailed description. 
32 Guowuyuan guanyu shixing fenshuizhi caizheng guanli tizhi de jueding (Decision of the State Council 
concerning implementation of tax sharing fiscal administrative system), (15 November 1993) 
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taxation bureaus (guoshuiju, STBs), vertically led by the State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT), as an independent agency responsible for collection of central taxes 
and central-local shared taxes33. Accordingly, the collections of local taxes were 
subject to local tax bureaus (dishuiju, LTBs) 34 (Table 5), which functioned as local 
taxation authority under the direct leadership of the local government. SAT only 
provided operational guidance to provincial LTB and comment on its personnel 
nomination to local government 35(Figure 1). 
[insert figure 1 here] 
[insert table 5 here] 
A few interim arrangements were enforced to compensate local government from 
1994 to 1997 so as to conciliate them, especially those rich provinces, and win their 
support for the new tax reform, which would impair their vested interests and power. 
The central government committed to rebating local government an amount equal to 
their loss in the new tax sharing system (TSS) based on a formula and promised them 
a share in the growth of VAT and consumption tax each year36. Meanwhile, some 
important laws and regulations were enacted to codify and standardize reform practice 
and tax administration. For instance, The Law of PRC on the Administration of Tax 
Collection37 was revised and its rule for implementation38 was issued to reinforce tax 
collection on the revenue side and The Budget Law of PRC39 was promulgated to 
                                                        
33 The shared tax would be transferred to local government based on the shared ratio. 
34 The Customs collected customs duties, partial VAT and consumption tax. Before 1996, Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) collected occupied farmland tax, deed tax, agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural produce and animal 
husbandry tax. However, State Administration of Taxation (SAT) has taken over them since 1996 except MOF 
remained the collection in some regions. 
35 Guowuyuan guanyu zujian guojia shuiwu zongju guanli zai gedi de zhishu shuiwu jigou he difang shuiwuju 
youguan wenti de tongzhi (Circular of the State Council on issues concerning establishing vertical led tax branches 
of SAT and local tax bureaus), (16 November 1993) 
36 Guowuyuan guanyu fenshuizhi caizheng guanli tizhi shuishou fanhuan gaiwei yu bendiqu zengzhishui he 
xiaofeishui zengzhanglv guagou de tongzhi (Circular of the State Council concerning linking tax rebate and 
growth rate of VAT and consumption tax under tax sharing fiscal administrative system), (24 August 1994) 
37 Promulgated by the twenty-seventh meeting of the Seventh National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
on 4 September 1992 and firstly revised on 28 February 1995. 
38 Promulgated by the State Council on 4 August 1993. 
39 Promulgated by the Second Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 22 March 1994. 
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enhance the control on the expenditure side. To defeat the rampant tax evasion and 
taxation official corruption, amendment to Criminal Law of PRC with new article of 
violating tax collection and dereliction of duty on taxation was approved in March 
199740. 
The Fifteenth National Party Congress convened in September 1997 suggested 
following fine-tuning stage 1998-2000. The report, Hold High the Great Banner of 
Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building 
Socialism With Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century41, addressed by Jiang 
Zemin fully summarized the success of tax reform 1994 and, then, appealed for 
further regulation on excessively high incomes and tax evasion, improvement of the 
individual income tax system, introduction of new taxes like inheritance tax42, and 
standardization of income distribution so as to narrow widening income gaps. In 
addition, due to unprecedented setback of the Asian Financial Crisis and international 
economic fluctuation, wide-ranging preferential tax policies had been actively 
employed to stimulate domestic demands, encourage investment and expand export. 
For instance, interest tax was levied in 199943. Orientation adjustment tax on 
investment in fixed asset was reduced 50% in 1999 and suspended in 200044. Stamp 
tax on security transaction was reduced from 5‰ to 4‰ in 199845. An investment 
tax credit program was firstly introduced to promote FIEs’ investment in 
technological renovation and R&D and purchasing domestic equipments46. Hi-tech 
                                                        
40 Amendment in Chapter 3 (new article 121), and Chapter 9, promulgated by the Fifth Session of the Eighth 
National People’s Congress on 14 March 1997.  
41 Gaoju Deng Xiaoping lilun weida qizhi, ba jianshe you zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shiye quanmian tuixiang 
21 shiji (Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory for an all-round advancement of the cause of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21st century), (12 September 1997) 
42 Hitherto the inheritance tax has not been levied. 
43  Guowuyuan guanyu dui chuxu cunkuan zhengshou geren suodeshui de shishi banfa (Measures for 
implementation of the State Council concerning levying interest tax on individual saving), (30 September 1999). 
44 Guojia shuiwu zongju guanyu zuohao guding zichan touzi fangxiang tiaojieshui tingzheng gongzuo de 
tongzhi (Circular of SAT on issues concerning suspending orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset), 
(28 March 2000). 
45 Guowuyuan guanyu tiaozheng zhengquan (gupiao) jiaoyi yinhuashui shuilv de tongzhi (Circular of the State 
Council concerning adjusting stamp tax on security transaction), (11 June 1998). 
46 Guojia shuiwu zongju guanyu waishang touzi qiye caigou guochan shebei tuishui guanli shixing banfa 
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enterprises were entitled to a tax preferential package47. In 1998-2000, several 
adjustments on exported VAT refund rate increased average rate from 8.29% in 1996, 
10% in 1998 to 15% in 1999, respectively48. Furthermore, in order to carry out the 
development of China’s vast western regions, considerable tax incentives were 
announced in 200049.  
 
Phase 3: Strengthening Market Economy, 2001-2020  
China’s accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 represented a 
historic breakthrough in reform and opening up and entailed brand new prospects for 
China’s economic, political and cultural progress. In 2002, the Sixteenth National 
Party Congress proclaimed that the socialist market economy had initially taken shape 
and vowed to strengthen and complement it by improving legal system for protecting 
private property rights and deregulating all sectors in economy50. Correspondingly, 
the fourth amendment to the Constitution added a clause: “Citizens’ lawful private 
property is inviolable.”51 Later, the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Issues 
Concerning the Improvement of Socialist Market Economic System (Decision 2003) 52 
charted the major tasks to further improve the market economy to build a well-off 
                                                                                                                                                               
(Interim provision of SAT concerning tax refund on FIEs’ purchasing domestic equipment), (20 September 1999) 
47 Caizhengbu guojia shuiwu zongju guanyu guanche luoshi ‘zhonggong zongyang guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang 
jishu chuangxin, fazhan gaokeji, shixian chanyehua de jueding’ youguan shuishou wenti de tongzhi (Circular of 
MOF and SAT on taxation issues concerning implementation of ‘decision of the CCP central committee and the 
State Council on strengthening technological innovation, developing hi-tech, realizing industrialization’), (2 
November 1999). 
48  Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce, PRC, 
http://caitec.mofcom.gov.cn 
49 Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu dakaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshi de tongzhi (Circular of the State Council 
concerning several policies on carrying out the development of China’s vast western regions), (26 October 2000).  
50 Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui, kaichuang zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shiye xinjumian (All-round build 
well-off society and initiate new phase of socialist cause with Chinese characteristics), (Jiang Zemin’s report on 
the Sixteenth National Party Congress, 8 November 2002). 
51 See the revised Article 13 in the fourth amendment to the Constitution of PRC approved by the Second 
Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 14 March 2004. 
52 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu wanshan shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding (Decision 
of the CCP Central Committee on Issues Concerning the Improvement of a Socialist Market Economic System), 
(Approved by the Third Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, 14 October 2003). 
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society in terms of narrowing the gap between urban and rural areas, promoting 
coordinated development of different regions, establishing a unified, open and orderly 
modern market system, improving macro-control, administration and economic legal 
systems, improving employment, income distribution and social security systems, and 
building a mechanism to promote sustainable social and economic development53.  
With regard to tax field, the Decision 2003 demanded a new round of tax reform in 
progress mainly covering export tax refund, unified income tax on enterprise, VAT, 
individual income tax, and tax-for-fee (fei gai shui) reform under the principles of 
simplifying tax system, broadening tax base, reducing tax rate and tightening 
collection and administration (jianshuizhi, kuanshuiji, dishuilü, yanzhengguan). Given 
the exacerbated arrears of export tax refund and pressure of fiscal deficit of central 
government, the export tax refund system was reformed in 2003 by lowering average 
tax refund rate of 3%, central-local shared shouldering the tax refund, and adjusting 
tax refund incentives to export product structure54. Unifying income tax regime on 
enterprises became more necessary to equalize the tax burden, regardless of their 
ownership structure or capital sources, because the present effective tax rate was 15% 
for FIEs and 25% for domestic enterprises55, which was inconsistent with national 
treatment stressed by WTO conventions and a level playing field for all enterprises. 
As a primary tax contributing 35.88% of total tax revenue in 2003 (Table 6), the VAT 
reform concentrated on shifting from “production-based” to “consumption-based” and 
widening the scope of VAT and consumption tax to reduce the negative impact of 
current VAT on enterprise’ ability and willingness to renew and upgrade technology 
and equipment. The tax officials and experts had reached a common consensus to 
restructure and tighten individual income tax system in that it should become a major 
tax and exert important redistribution role in the future. New social security tax and 
property tax were under designing to accommodate rapid social and economic growth.  
                                                        
53 See Xinhua News, 21 October 2003, www.chinaview.cn  
54 Guowuyuan guanyu gaige xianxing chukou tuishui jizhi de jueding (Decision of the State Council concerning 
reform on existing export tax refund system), (13 October 2003) 
55 See Mattew Mui and Ian Jia, China Reforms for the World Stage, International Tax Review, 1 March 2002 
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[insert table 6 here] 
The uppermost important focus was the tax-for-fee reform, particularly, in rural 
region56. Solving problems of agriculture, farmers and rural area (sannong wenti) 
were claimed as the top priority task of the state57. Hailed as one of the most 
important documents this year, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council 
jointly issued the No.1 Document on increasing farmer’s income, the sixth No.1 
document since 198258 which demonstrated the willingness and practical measures of 
central authority to improve and solve the rural problems. The tax-for-fee reform was 
attributed to the essential part of the whole reform for rural problems. To release rural 
tax burden and balance urban and rural development, Anhui province preceded by 
pilot experiment in 2000, namely, “three abolishment, two adjustments, and one 
change” (sanquxiao liangtiaozheng yigaige) which stood for 1) abolishing five 
township fees and surcharges (wutong) 59 , raised fund for rural education, and 
slaughter tax; 2) adjusting agriculture tax with taxable agricultural output-base and 
agricultural tax rate subject to 7%, and tax on special agricultural produce with tax 
computation and rate; and 3) reforming village levies and financial management in 
terms of abolishing three levies (santi)60 and financing village by unified surcharges 
to agricultural tax. Based on Anhui’s experience, the State Council announced a 
                                                        
56 See e.g. Ray Yep, “Can ‘Tax-for-fee’ Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, Progress and 
Limitations”, The China Quarterly, No.177 (2004), pp.42-71 for detailed discussion.  
57 See Premier Wen Jiabao’s government work report on the Second Session of the Tenth National People's 
Congress, 5 March 2004. 
58 For five successive years from 1982 and 1986, the central authority issued five No. 1 Documents on 
agriculture, rural regions and farmers to boost rural development. The sixth No. 1 Documents, Zhonggong 
zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu cujin nongmin zengjia shouru ruogan zhengce de yijian (Document of the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council on issues concerning increasing farmer’s income), was jointly issued by 
the CCP Central Committee and the State Council by on 8 February 2004. 
59 Wutong are five township fees for expenditure on rural education, birth control, welfare for veterans, militia 
training and transportation.  
60 Santi are three village fees: 1) accumulation fund (gongjijin) for collective investment such as irrigation 
construction, collective enterprises, etc., 2) commonweal fund (gongyijin) for collective welfare such as asylum for 
old people, almsgiving for poor family, etc., 3) and administrative fee (guanlifei) for salary of village cadre and 
running expenses.  
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circular to press ahead the pilot experiment61 and, thus, expanded the test into 20 
provinces in 2002 and national wide in 2003 62 .  Additionally, on a national 
conference for rural tax-for-fee pilot reform, Premier Wen Jiabao advanced three 
improving measures calling for further alleviating rural tax burden in grain producing 
areas, abolishing tax on special agricultural produce, and fixing ceiling rate of 
agricultural tax and its surcharges63 and reiterated them in his government work 
report to the Second Session of the Tenth National People's Congress in 2004 in 
which he also depicted that “all taxes on special agricultural products will be repealed 
except for tobacco, thus reducing the financial burden on farmers by 4.8 billion yuan 
annually. Beginning this year, the agricultural tax rate will be reduced by more than 1 
percentage point per year on average, and agricultural taxes will be rescinded in five 
years. The agricultural tax burden on farmers will be reduced by 7 billion yuan this 
year. The central government will appropriate 39.6 billion yuan this year from its 
budget for transfer payments to support the reform of rural taxes and administrative 
charges.”64  
 
 What happens at sub-provincial level 
  Despite numerous changes of national tax regime during last two decades, its 
influence, for the most part, effected on the provincial level because of the guideline 
of devolution of central authority and promotion of local incentives (fangquan rangli). 
For instance, during the overhaul of tax reform 1994, the central government issued 
documents 65  to explicitly stipulate administrative and tax-shared rules on 
                                                        
61 Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu zuohao nongcun shuifei gaige shidian gongzuo de tongzhi (Circular of the State 
Council concerning furthering rural tax-for-fee pilot reform), (24 March 2001). 
62 Guowuyuan guanyu quanmian tuijin nongxun shuifei gaige shidian gongzuo de yijian (Circular of the State 
Council on guidance concerning well-round furthering rural tax-for-fee pilot reform), (27 March 2003). 
63 See Wen Jiabao’s talk on national conference for rural tax-for-fee pilot reform, 3 April 2003. 
64 See Xinhua News, 16 March 2004, www.chinaview.cn 
65 Guowuyuan guanyu shixing fenshuizhi caizheng gaunli tizhi de jueding (Decision of the State Council 
concerning implementation of tax-sharing fiscal administrative system), (15 December 1993); Shixing 
“fenshuizhi” caizheng tizhi hou youguan yusuan guanli wenti de zanxing guiding (Provisional regulation on issues 
concerning budgetary administration under tax-sharing fiscal administrative system), (Jointed issued by Ministry 
of Finance, the People’s Bank of China and SAT on 18 December 1993). 
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central-provincial level whereas simply suggested provinces improve sub-provincial 
fiscal administration in line with tax-sharing system66. Thus, provinces were endowed 
with considerable discretionary power in implementations of central policy and took 
full advantage of such leeway to achieve local interests. Aiming at sub-provincial 
diversity, our field research covers provincial, prefecture, county and township level 
in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province, among which we mainly focuses on township level 
since it is the lowest governmental administrative level directly interacting with the 
local economic regime and shouldering heavy task assigned from superior. Moreover, 
as a base of pyramidal governmental system, the fiscal function of township 
determines the stability of national macro-economy67. Based on two cases of M68 and 
L69 township and in-depth interviews with officials, scholars and entrepreneurs, we 
perceive two separated tax regimes at sub-provincial level, especially at township 
level, presents effective considerable diversities in terms of various preferential tax 
policies which diverge from a unified one promulgated by the laws and regulations. 
Actually, a circle of tax revenue inflow and budgetary expenditure outflow shapes the 
local tax regime due to local incentives encouraging economic development. 
Meanwhile, under current financial management system, upper jurisdictions biting off 
lower level’s financial revenue exacerbates the latter’s financial strain and, then, 
compels lower level government to accumulate revenue through new sources and 
means.  
 
                                                        
66 Caizhengbu guanyu wanshan sheng yixia fenshuizhi caizheng guanli tizhi yijian de tognzhi (Circular of the 
Ministry of Finance on issues concerning improving sub-provincial fiscal administrative system under tax-sharing 
system), (26 March 1996). 
67 See e.g. Gang Zhu, Yuanhong Zhang and Jun Zhang, Jujiao Zhongguo Nongcun Caizheng (Focus on Rural 
Finance in China), (Shanxi: Shanxi Jingji Chubanshe, 2000); Tanzhen Sun, Xiandai Zhongguo Nongcun Caizhwng 
Wenti Yanjiu (Study on Rural Fiscal Problems in Modern China), (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 1995). 
68 Situated at 10 minutes distance to Suzhou, Jiangsu province, M township covers 34 square kilometers with 
population of 53,000 in 2003. 
69 L township is located at 15 kilometers away from Hanghzou, capital of Zhejiang province and covers 43 
square kilometers with population of 60,000 in 2003. 
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Stretching tax regime in hidden ways 
As fiscal reach of the state, the sub-provincial tax regime not only covers 
conventional taxes, including central, local and central-local shared taxes, but also 
stretches into extrabudgetary revenue, a supplement to formal budget system in names 
of funds, surcharges and fees, and a new off-budgetary revenue source, proceeds of 
land-sale70. Such revenue elements of taxes, quasi-taxes and extraction of ownership 
indicate the local state still on the march of transformation from old “owner-state” 
surviving upon controlled and owned production means and resources71 to modern 
“tax-state” depending upon tax ability to extract surplus from economic sectors72.  
Currently, 26 taxes are imposed on the economic sector to extract surplus for the 
state. According to tax collection division, the central taxes and shared taxes are 
firstly accumulated into central account by state tax bureau and local taxes into local 
account by local tax bureau. Then, under tax-sharing system, part of central and local 
tax revenues are allocated into township level ordinary budgetary revenue (We will 
discuss it later.). Table 7 shows the total tax revenue at the M township of 
129,082,000 RMB in the first-half-year 2003 and the per capita is 2253 RMB where 
central tax revenue dominated by 60.52%. 
[insert table 7 here] 
Extrabudgetary revenue originated in 1950 initiatively to finance local 
government’s earmarked expenditure and remained a minor revenue resource before 
1980. However, it experienced a vicious spiral and became a major part of local 
revenue entering 1980s that induced central state’s enforcement of control and 
overhaul on it.73 According to legal definition74, the budgetary revenue is composed 
                                                        
70 In China, due to public ownership of lands, the transaction is carried out in an alternative way of transferring 
usage right for certain period, e.g. 20, 30 or 50 years. 
71 John Campbell, “An Institutional Analysis of Fiscal Reform in Postcommunist Europe”, Theory and Society, 
Vol. 25 (1996), pp. 45-84. 
72 Joseph A. Schumpeter, “The Crisis of Tax State” (1918), in Richard Swedberg (eds.), Joseph A. Schumpeter: 
The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
73 See e.g. Christine Wong, Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China, (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1997); “Fiscal Dualism in China: Gradualist Reform and the Growth of Off-budget 
Finance”, in Donald J. S. Brean (eds.), Taxation in Modern China, (New York: Routledge Press, 1998); Gang Fan, 
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of tax revenue, proceeds from state-owned assets, special revenue and other revenue 
while extrabudgetary revenue consists of administrative service charges, funds, and 
surcharges on taxes which are either levied by laws and regulations or authorized by 
the State Council, the provincial government or corresponding financial and price 
regulation departments. And these two sorts of revenues are subject to on-budgetary 
administration. With regard to above characteristics, the current extrabudgetary 
revenue is the same as tax with legal coercion and obligation in nature. Regardless of 
significant difference of specific names and items listed on the budgetary sheet (Table 
8 and 9), they similarly function as the extraction of the state from economic sector. 
Therefore, the tax regime spread out over extrabudgetary revenue in non-tax means. 
In the first-half-year 2003, extrabudgetary revenue of M township reached 28.23% of 
total tax revenue and 54.77% of total financial revenue with 36,437,500 RMB (Table 
8). L township presented extrabudgetary revenue of budgetary fund revenue, 
earmarked fund revenue and other revenue and held a striking high ratio of actual 
exrabudgetary revenue (136,797,300 RMB) to total financial revenue (180,950,100 
RMB) at 75.60% in 2003 (Table 9). 
[insert table 8 and 9 here] 
As off-budgetary revenue, proceeds of land-sale are kept in a separated account and 
partly allocated into the financial revenue pool under extrabudgetary account to 
finance extra expenditure (We will discuss it later.)75 according to the need of budget 
balance in that local financial department are forbidden to make deficit. Faced 
tightening administration and supervision on extrabudgetady revenue, township 
government, to a greater extent, appeal to proceeds of land-sales as a hidden and safe 
                                                                                                                                                               
“Lun gonggong shouzhi de xinguifan (New Norms of Public Revenue and Expenditure)”, Jing Ji Yan Jiu 
(Economic Studies), Vol.6, (1995), pp. 34-43; “Market-oriented Economic Reform and the Growth of Off-budget 
Local Public Finance”, in Donald J. S. Brean (eds.), Taxation in Modern China, (New York: Routledge Press, 1998) 
for detailed discussion 
74 The Budget Law of People’s Republic of China (Promulgated by the Second Session of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress on 22 March 1994); Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang yusuanwai zijin guanli de jueding (Decision 
of the State Council concerning enforcement of administration on extrabudgetary capital), (6 September 1996) 
75 The county, prefecture or provincial (not township) land resource bureau is the authority to sanction and 
operate land transactions. The proceeds stay on a separated account in corresponding financial bureau. 
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revenue source via market transaction of usage right of lands. In fact, the wave of 
privatising state-owned or collective-owned assets (SOEs, TVEs, etc.) has already 
released most resources controlled by township government and made land a sheet 
anchor of them in hand for remaining direct influence in economic sector and 
extracting economic rents. Unsurprisingly, the proceeds of land-sales become the 
backbone of extrabudgetary revenue. As in M township, the proceeds of land-sale 
shows up 49.27% of actual extrabudgetary revenue (Table 8) and in L township, this 
ratio hit 83.24% in 2003 (Table 9). In addition to profits on one-off land transaction, 
some township government like M township establish special business company to 
develop lands and buildings and, then, lease them to private enterprises so that such 
rents form sustainable income source and, particularly, stay under off-budgetary 
management for township.  
 
Complex tax- sharing system with biting-off effect 
Compared to relative simple and rule-based central-provincial tax sharing system, 
the sub-provincial one is much more complex and arbitrary.  As showed in table 10, 
the M township in Suzhou, Jiangsu province play with complicated rules of the game 
which consists of 7 sections: shares of central tax revenue, shares of growth part of 
local tax revenue, ratified budgetary expenditure, ratified budgetary expenditure of 
financial department, monomial shared tax items, subsidy from superior and 
remittance to prefecture level. Each section adopts distinct calculations and surrenders 
to different principles, such as quota-based, growth-based, progressive or regressive 
sharing, etc. 
[insert table 10 here] 
Such complex system facilitates superiors to bite off lower level’s tax revenue and 
yields astonishing encroachment. The province, prefecture or county are able to 
arbitrarily adjust shared ratios and alter shared rules by issuing official documents 
(hongtou wenjian). For instance, as for growth-based shared tax revenue from central 
taxes, i.e. VAT and consumption tax, in 2003 (Table 11), M township obtained due 
shared revenue of 6,209,812 RMB at 3.88% of total two taxes revenue. After Suzhou, 
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superior of M township, grasped 0.6% remittance ratio from M’s small cake, the latter 
merely got 3.28%. In addition, Suzhou increased their bite-off ratio to 1.6% in 2004, 
which would cut M township’s share to 2.06%, optimistically predicted. The division 
of local shared part (25%) of VAT in Jiangsu province is also unfavourable to lower 
jurisdiction for the ratio of province, prefecture, district (county) and township is 
50:16:6.8:27.2. Obviously, the township still keeps a small share. 
[insert table 11 here] 
 
Dual tax regime: tightened versus loosed  
Being crucial measure of tax reform 1994, a dual system of taxation 
management--the state tax bureau and local tax bureau--was introduced to curb 
central tax revenue shrinkage and resolve the local-tax-revenue-withholding problem. 
On one hand, state tax bureau collect both central taxes and central-local shared taxes 
so as to ensure central government’s tax revenue; on the other hand, depending on its 
own agencies, central government are able to effectively enforce central taxation 
policy and effect regulation and supervision. Thereby, the state tax regime is much 
more tightened and rigid than local tax regime which is mainly manipulated by local 
government to serve local interests in spite of nominal compliance with central 
taxation laws, regulations and policies. The local tax regime is not only flexible of 
various preferential taxation policies, such as tax refund, rebate, break, exemption, 
holiday, etc., but also accommodating for negotiable taxable base or duty. In 1993, 
1998 and 2000, the central government successively issued circulars to reinforce 
taxation administration and restrict local preferential taxation policy.76 In 2002, the 
central government even shifted the enterprise income tax and individual income tax 
that previously belonged to local taxes into central-local shared tax in order to impose 
                                                        
76 Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang shuishou guanli he yuange kongzhi jianmian shuishou de tongzhi (Circular of 
the State Council concerning enforcement of taxation administration and restrict control of taxation rebate and 
exepmtion), (23 July 1993); Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang yifa zhishui yange shuishou guanli quanxian de tongzhi 
(Circular of the State Council concerning legal enforcement of taxation administration and restricting taxation 
authority), (12 March 1998); Guowuyuan guanyu jiuzheng difang zixing zhiding shuishou xiangzheng houfan 
zhengce de tongzhi (Circular of the State Council concerning redressing local government’s tax refund policy), (11 
January 2000) 
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hard constrain on them77. To some extent, these efforts achieved the proposed purpose. 
State tax bureaus streamline their administrative structure by scientific labour division 
of collection, administrative and supervision branch in horizontal level as well as 
reduction of administrative hierarchy in vertical level, simplify tax registration, 
declaration and payment procedure by internet service and transparentize taxation 
policies and administration by periodical news release, online survey, hotline service, 
and the like. So do local tax bureaus. 
Yet, local tax bureau, on the surface, conduct standardized and normative operation 
in accordance with state tax bureau and central regulations and policies. Indeed, they 
are only one slice of revenue side of township government. If encapsulate expenditure 
side, we would hold a complete picture of capital circle for tax regime in effect. As 
showed in Figure 2, revenues of taxes, funds, surcharges, fees and land-sales flow into 
financial revenue pool from which partial capital float up to superior and the 
remainder to finance expenditure package. Besides public expenditure, such as state 
payrolls, public projects, education, etc., a considerable amount is allocated to 
supporting local economic sector in names of bonus, grants, subsidy, award and the 
like in that local governments are forbidden to entitle tax rebate or exemption to 
enterprises according to central policy, which results in alternatives of changing tax 
preferential forms into ex post reimbursements from local financial department which 
is out of SAT’s administration and even out of Ministry of Finance. Since 1999, L 
township has enforced various local policies other than central preferential tax 
policies to promote local economic prosperity and, especially, they intensified 
promotion measures in 2001 because of increasing pressure of competition for 
investment between different jurisdictions. Those new enterprises established in 2001 
are entitled to de facto three-years-exemption of local tax, including VAT, EIT, 
business tax, etc. For those old enterprises investing in technology innovation above 
10 million RMB, they enjoy a three-years tax refund equals to growth part above tax 
payment in 2001 as a base. In 2003, the tax refund to enterprises under item of 
                                                        
77 Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa suodeshui shouru fenxiang gaige fangan de tongzhi (Circular of the State Council 
concerning issuing reform scheme of income tax sharing), (31 December 2001) 
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expenditure for industry and transportation reached 37,691,100 RMB at 20.86% of L 
township’s total financial expenditure. Supplementary to single tax preferential 
treatment, L township invested in infrastructure of 46,309,700 RMB (25.63%) and in 
education of 64,911,300 RMB (35.93%) to improve investment environment (Table 
12). Discounted, or even gratis, land price is another crucial instrument to succeed in 
jurisdiction competition for investment. Consequently, 40 enterprises from other 
localities were attracted to L township among 83 new established enterprise in 2003.  
[insert figure 2 here] 
[insert table 12 here] 
 
Conclusion and policy implication 
This article has identified the sub-provincial, particularly township level, diversity 
and divergence of tax regime from national one and presented comprehensive analysis 
of findings from field research. 
The transformation of local state from “Campbellian owner-state” to 
“Schumpeterian tax-state” would continue until various funds, surcharges and fees are 
sorted out by abolishing, integrating, or transforming into tax according to 
constitution and law. Furthermore, such restructure of local revenue would solve the 
problem of the tragedy of the commons78 that overlapping bases of taxes, funds, 
surcharges, fees and ownership-extraction serve as a common pool resource 
overgrazed by various vertical-level governments and, also, transparentize effective 
tax burden of economic sectors.  
To simplify and standardize the sub-provincial tax sharing system is imperative for 
economic stability in that current complex and arbitrary tax-sharing scheme and 
confiscatory behaviour of superior would frustrate lower level government and force 
them misbehave in revenue raising. The arbitrary tax adjustments and inappropriate 
transfers cause the “ratchet effect” 79  which spoils lower level government’s 
                                                        
78 H.S. Gordon, “The Economics of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery”, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol.62 (1954), pp.124-42; Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, Vol.162, No.3859 (1968), 
pp.1243-4. 
79 Martin L. Weitzman, “The ‘Ratchet Principle’ and Performance Incentives”, The Bell Journal of Economics, 
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incentives to foster local economic development and, thus, increase tax revenues. 
While less rule-based sharing system would yield the “tax theft problem”80 that drive 
subordinate government to steal shared tax revenue by squeezing revenue from shared 
to local pool or, even, actively seeking off-budgetary revenue out of national 
budgetary administration.  
On the premise of ensuring unification and authority of taxation law nationwide 
and the first place of central tax revenue, the sub-provincial government should be 
granted more power and autonomy over taxation. With consideration of increasing 
allocation, distribution and stabilization function in context of market economy, the 
balance between responsibility and budgetary or tax authority should be stroked along 
various levels of sub-provincial government. To finance their soaring public 
expenditures and fulfil diversified and growing local demands for public goods, 
special region-based local taxes instead of nationwide applicable should be levied and 
authorized by corresponding local government whom are entitled to set tax bases, 
adjust tax rates, stipulate tax scope, etc., within the limits provided by law. Meanwhile, 
to endow local government limited right to enforce preferential tax policy would 
facilitate administration on such effective practice and prevent localities from “racing 
to the bottom”81 for investments and enterprises.  
In short, based on diverse natural endowments, historical legacies, and current 
development status, variation and divergence of sub-provincial tax regime are not 
only unavoidable but also necessary to effect central reform, boost local economic 
prosperity and stabilize national macro-economy. Simultaneously, local self-interest 
seeking inevitably drive local government to exploit such disparity and policy leeway 
in ways of localized adaptation of central policy (yin di zhi yi) and, consequently, call 
for further decentralization. 
                                                                                                                                                               
Vol.11, No.1 (1980), pp.302-8. 
80Andrei Shleifer, and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia, 
(Harvard: MIT Press, 2000). 
81 Christopher Grandy, “New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929”, Journal of Economic History, 
Vol.49, No.3 (1989), pp.677-92. 
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Table 1: China’s Tax Regime, 1978-1991 
No. Tax Item 
 Turnover Taxes 
1 Value-added tax 
2 Product tax 
3 Business tax 
4 Consolidated industrial and commercial tax 
5 Particular adjustment tax 
6 Customs duties 
7 Special consumption tax 
  Income Taxes 
8 Income tax on state-owned enterprises 
9 Income tax on collective enterprises 
10 Income tax on individual unit of industry and commerce 
11 Income tax on foreign enterprises 
12 Income tax on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
13 Income tax on foreign business enterprises 
14 Income tax on private enterprises 
15 Individual income tax  
16 Adjustment tax on individual income 
17 Tax on bonus of state-owned enterprises 
18 Adjustment tax on wage of state-owned enterprises 
19 Tax on bonus of collective enterprises 
20 Tax on bonus of non-profit enterprises 
21 Agricultural tax 
22 Tax on special agricultural produce  
  Resource Taxes 
23 Resource tax 
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24 Occupied farmland tax 
25 Urban and township land usage tax 
26 Special tax on burning oil 
27 Salt tax 
  Property and Behaviour Taxes 
28 Real estate tax 
29 Urban maintenance and construction tax 
30 Vehicle and vessel usage license tax 
31 Stamp tax 
32 Deed tax 
33 Slaughter tax 
34 Banquet tax 
35 Livestock transaction tax 
36 Bazaar transaction tax 
37 Orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset 
 National Funds  
38 Funds for key construction of energy and transportation 
39 Adjustment funds for budget 
Source:  
State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn   
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Table 2: The Central and National Financial Revenue in GDP (%), 1978-1993  
Year Central /National Financial Revenue National Financial Revenue/GDP 
1978 15.5 31.2 
1980 24.5 25.7 
1985 38.4 22.4 
1986 36.7 20.8 
1987 33.5 18.4 
1988 32.9 15.8 
1989 30.9 15.8 
1990 33.8 15.8 
1991 29.8 14.6 
1992 28.1 13.1 
1993 22.0 12.6 
Note:  
Domestic and foreign debts are excluded. 
Source:  
China Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2003) 
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Table 3: China’s Tax Regime, 1994-2000 
No. Tax Item Central Shared a Local 
 Turnover Taxes    
1 Value-added tax (VAT)  X  
2 Consumption tax X   
3 Business tax   X b 
4 Customs duties X   
 Income Taxes    
5 Enterprise income tax   X  
6 Income tax on FIEs and FEs c X   
7 Individual income tax  X  
8 Agricultural tax   X 
9 Tax on special agricultural produce   X 
10 Animal husbandry tax    X 
 Resource Taxes    
11 Resource tax   X d 
12 Urban and township land usage tax   X 
13 Occupied farmland tax   X 
 Property and Behavior Taxes    
14 Real estate tax e   X 
15 Urban real estate tax e   X 
16 Land appreciation tax   X 
17 Urban maintenance and construction tax f   X 
18 Stamp tax  X  
19 Deed tax   X 
20 Vehicle acquisition tax X   
21 Vehicle and vessel usage license tax   X 
22 Vehicle and vessel usage tax   X 
   28
23 Vessel tonnage tax   X 
24 Slaughter tax g   X 
25 Banquet tax g   X 
26 Orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset h   X 
Notes: 
a. The taxes in the category of shared mean they will be shared by the central and local government based 
on predetermined formulas. 
b. Business taxes on Ministry of railway, headquarters of banks, headquarters of insurance companies 
belong to central state while the rest belong to local state. 
c. Enterprises with foreign investment (FIEs) include Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, 
Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises established in China; 
Foreign enterprises (FEs) include foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organizations that 
are not Chinese legal entities, but have establishment or places in China and are engaged in production 
or business operations. The nominal tax rate of income tax on FIEs and FEs is 33% in which 30% 
belongs to central state and 3% local state. 
d. Resource tax on ocean and petrol companies belong to central state while the rest belong to local state. 
e. Real estate tax is applicable to domestic enterprises and Chinese citizens; while urban real estate tax is 
applicable to FEs, FIEs and foreigners.  
f. Urban maintenance and construction tax on Ministry of railway, headquarters of banks, headquarters of 
insurance companies belong to central state while the rest belong to local state. 
g. According to a circular (Guofa[1994]No.7) issued by the State Council, local government should 
decide to remain or abolish the slaughter tax and banquet tax. 
h. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly issued a circular (Caishuifa[1999] No.299) to suspend 
levying the orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset. 
Source:  
State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn 
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Table 4: Central-local Shared Taxes and Shared Rate 
Shared Taxes Central Local 
VAT a 75% 25% 
Enterprises income tax b 
50%(2002) 
60%(2003) 
50%(2002)c 
40%(2003) 
Individual income tax e 
50%(2002) 
60%(2003) 
50%(2002) 
40%(2003) 
Stamp tax 
94% of taxes on security 
transaction  
6% of taxes on security 
transaction 
Other stamp taxes 
Notes: 
a. VATs collected by the Customs are excluded. 
b. Enterprise income taxes on Ministry of railway, headquarters of banks, ocean and petrol companies 
belong to the central government. The EIT on other domestic enterprises was local fixed tax before 
2002 while became the shared tax after then. 
c. The shared rates change based on central government’s decision. 
d. Taxes on individual interests belong to the central government. The IIT was local fisxed tax before 
2002 while became the shared tax after then. 
Source:  
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Taxation laws, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2003)  
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Table 5: Tax Collections by Authorities 
Collection Authority Items 
State tax bureaus (STBs) 
Consumption tax, VAT, income tax on enterprises a, Income tax on 
FIEs and FEs, stamp tax on security transaction, vehicle acquisition 
tax 
Local tax bureaus (LTBs) 
Business tax, individual income tax b, resource tax, urban and 
township land usage tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, 
real estate tax, urban real estate tax, land appreciation tax, vehicle 
and vessel usage license tax, vehicle and vessel usage tax, slaughter 
tax, banquet tax, other stamp taxes 
Customs 
Customs duties, VAT (collected by Customs), consumption tax 
(collected by the Customs), vessel tonnage tax 
MOF/LTBs 
Agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural produce, animal 
husbandry tax, deed tax, and occupied farmland tax 
Notes: 
a. For those enterprises established before 1 January 2002, the enterprise income tax (domestic) are 
collected by the local tax bureau; while for those after that the EIT are collected by the state bureau. 
EIT on central government owned enterprises, ministry of railway, headquarters of banks, ocean and 
petrol companies are also collected by the state bureau. 
b. Individual income tax became shared tax in 2002 but it is still collected by the local tax bureau. 
Sources:  
a. Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Taxation laws, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2003) 
b. State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn 
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Table 6 Composition of National Tax Revenue, 2003 
Tax Items  Percentage 
Indirect Taxes  
Value-added tax (VAT) 35.88% 
Consumption tax 5.78% 
Business tax 14.02% 
Customs duties 13.63% 
  
Direct Taxes  
Enterprise Income tax 11.44% 
Income tax on FIEs and FEs 3.45% 
Individual income tax 6.93% 
Real estate tax 1.58% 
  
Other Taxes 7.29% 
Source:  
State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn  
   32
 
Table 7 Total Tax Revenue Raised by M township, Jan.-Jun. 2003 (RMB) 
No. Item Actual amount  Percentage (%) Per capita c 
1 Central tax revenue a 72,266,200 60.52 1364 
2 Local tax revenue b 47,136,300 39.48 889 
3 Total 119,402,500 100 2253 
Notes: 
a. Item 1 is VAT and consumption tax collected by state tax bureau. 
b. Item 2 excludes taxes collected by local financial department, i.e. agricultural tax, occupied farmland tax, 
deed tax, etc. 
c. The population was 53,000 in the end of 2003. 
Source: 
     Respondent 24 
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Table 8 Total Financial Revenue of M township, Jan.-Jun. 2003 (RMB) 
No. Item Actual amount  Percentage (%) 
1 Total financial revenue a 66,526,500 100 
2 Budgetary revenue 30,089,000 45.23 
3 Shared tax revenue from superior 21,223,200  
4 Reimbursement of revenue target 8,500,000  
5 Earmarked subsidy 365,800  
    
6 Extrabudgetary revenue 36,437,500 54.77 
7 Fee for sanitation&landscaping 475,700  
8 Fee for land transaction 3,487,900  
9 Fee for sewage disposal 3,400,000  
10 Surcharges on education fee 2,716,700  
11 Other revenues b 26,357,200  
12 Fee for public utility c -  
13 Water rates c -  
14 Fee for family planning 35,200  
15 Banking interests 23,000  
16 Tax refund from superior 7,576,800  
17 Subsidy from superior 200,000  
18 Proceeds of land-sale 17,952,200 49.27 d 
19 Fee for public security 420,000  
20 Other revenue 150,000  
Notes: 
a. 1=2+6 
b. 11=12+13+14+15+16+17+18+19+20 
c. Item 12 and 13 are transferred to financial department in the end of the year. 
d. Proceeds of land-sale are 49.27% of extrabudgetary revenue. 
Source: 
Respondent 24 
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Table 9 Total Financial Revenue of L township, 2003 (RMB) 
No. Item Actual amount Percentage (%) 
1 Total financial revenue 180,950,100  100 
2 Budgetary revenue 44,152,800  24.40 
3 Shared tax revenue from superior 32,930,500  
4 Reimbursement of revenue target 8,288,200  
5 Earmarked subsidy 2,794,100  
6 Other subsidy 140,000  
    
7 Budgetary fund revenue 9,848,400  5.44 
8 Surcharges on rural education fee 8,348,400  
9 Surcharges on education fee 1,500,000  
10 Earmarked fund revenue 25,972,300  14.35 
11 Revenue from owned enterprises a 11,000,000  
12 Revenue from departments/institutions b 2,314,200  
13 Water conservancy construction fund 632,300  
14 Proceeds of education-assets-sale 3,740,000  
15 Other 8,285,800  
16 Other revenue 100,976,600  55.80 
17 Proceeds of land-sale 80,668,400 83.24 f 
18 Fee for land transaction 16,256,100  
19 Revenue from welfare enterprises c 3,075,900  
20 Agriculture subsidy 976,200  
Notes: 
a. Township government gains dividends based on shares owned in the enterprises. 
b. Some governmental departments or institutions are authority to charge fees for certain service. 
c. Some of welfare enterprises are public enterprises that hire disabled people.  
d. 1=2+7+10+16 
e. Extrabudgetary revenue=7+10+16=96,907,479 RMB, 75.60% of total financial revenue. 
f. Proceeds of land-sale are 83.24% of extrabudgetary revenue. 
Source: 
Respondent 26 
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Table 10 Shared Scheme of Tax Revenue at M township, 2003 (RMB) 
No. Item Amount Remarks 
1 
Shares of central tax 
revenue 
6,209,900 
Three brackets of progressive shared ratio 
based on the growth part of VAT and 
Consumption tax; 1=7+8+9 
2 VAT and Consumption tax 160,078,800 2=3+4 
3 VAT 159,606,100  
4 Consumption tax 472,700  
5 Revenue target 120,172,100
Total tax revenue of VAT and Consumption tax 
in 2002 
6 Actual growth part 39,906,700 6=2-5 
7 
Shares based on 0-12% part 
of item 5 1,730,500 Shared ratio 12%; 7=5*12%*12% 
8 
Shares based on 12-15% part 
of item 5 540,800 Shared ratio 15%; 8=5*(15%-12%)*15% 
9 
Shares based on above 15% 
part of item 5 3,938,600 Shared ratio 18%; 9=(6-5*15%)*18% 
    
10 
Shares of growth part of 
local tax revenue 
42,076,700 
10=15*shared ratio+16*(1-20%)*shared ratio; 
Shared ratio is 50% in 2003. The 20% here is 
the share of provincial level and the rest is 
shared between township and county level. 
11 Local tax revenue 96,846,200 
11=local tax revenue-urban maintenance and 
construction tax-urban and township land 
usage tax-land appreciation tax + income tax
(2001)*60%+deed tax*90%+other  
12 Revenue target 11,333,700 Task assigned by superior 
13 Revised revenue target 12,467,100 13=12*110% 
14 Actual growth part in 2003 84,379,100 14=11-13 
15 Actual growth part in 2000 13,122,700 The calculation is the same as the 14. 
16 Surplus 71,256,400 16=14-15 
    
17 
Ratified budgetary 
expenditure 8,575,300 
According to document issued by Wuzhong 
district financial department. 
    
18 
Budgetary expenditure of 
financial department 425,000 
According to document issued by Wuzhong 
district financial department. 
    
19 Monomial shared tax items 5,662,400 19=20+21+22+23+24+25 
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20 
Urban maintenance and 
construction tax 
3,645,300 20=UMCT in 2003-UMCT in 2000 
21 
Urban and township land 
usage tax 
81,900
21=Urban and township land usage tax in 
2003*20% 
22 Land appreciation tax 349,600
22=Land appreciation tax in 
2003*(1-20%)*80% 
23 
Tax on special agricultural 
produce 
-  
24 Occupied farmland tax 975,000 24= Occupied farmland tax in 2003 
25 
Surcharges on urban 
education  
610,600
25=Surcharges of urban education in 
2003*(1-3%)*40% 
    
26 Subsidy from superior 3,754,500 e.g. subsidy for agriculture tax from the central 
state 
    
27 
Remittance to prefecture 
level 
1,701,600 
26=total revenue*0.6%; Suzhou possess 0.6% 
of total revenue from township level. 
28 Total shared tax revenue 65,002,100 28=1+10+17+18+19+26-27 
Source: 
Respondent 24 
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Table 11 Actual Growth-based Shared Revenue from VAT and Consumption Tax 
at M township, 2003 and 2004 (RMB) 
No. Item 2003  2004  Remarks 
1 VAT and consumption tax 160078800 210000000 a
Total tax revenue of VAT and 
Consumption tax collected. 
2 Revenue target 120172100 160078800 
Total tax revenue of VAT and 
Consumption tax collected in last year. 
3 
Growth part above revenue 
target 
39906700 49921200 3=1-2 
4 
Share based on 0-12% part of 
growth part 
1730478  2305135  Shared ratio 12%; 4=2*12%*12% 
5 
Share based on 12-15% part of 
growth part 
540774  720355  
Shared ratio 15%; 
5=2*(15%-12%)*15% 
6 
Share based on above 15% 
part of growth part 
3938559  4663688  Shared ratio 18%; 6=(3-2*15%)*18% 
7 Due shared revenue 6209812  7689178  7=4+5+6 
8 Remittance to prefecture level 960473  3360000  
8=1*remittance ratio; (0.6% 2003, 
1.6% 2004) 
9 Actual shred revenue 5249339  4329178  9=7-8 
10 Actual shared percentage (%) 3.28% 2.06% 10=9/1 
Note: 
a. This is the predicted figure based on revenue task 2004. 
Source: 
Respondent 24 
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Table 12 Total financial expenditure of L township, 2003 
No. Item Actual amount Percentage (%)
1 Total financial expenditure 180,655,300 100 
2 Agriculture 4,439,400 2.46 
3 Industry and transportation a 37,691,100 20.86 
4 Recreation and cultural  8,146,700 4.51 
5 Education  64,911,300 35.93 
6 Health and hygiene  3,457,200 1.91 
7 Financial and statistic departments 220,000 0.12 
8 Social protection 4,144,200 2.29 
9 Retirement pension for administrative departments 209,800 0.12 
10 Administrative expenditure 9,561,700 5.29 
11 Urban maintenance and construction 46,309,700 25.63 
12 Other expenditure 1,564,200 0.87 
 
Note: 
a. Such expenditure actually is local tax refund of L township to enterprises. 
Source: 
Respondent 26 
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Figure 1: Structure of Taxation Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
a. The hierarchy of taxation administration is corresponding to government administrative structure. 
b. The black line refers to vertical leadership. 
c. The dashed line refers to operational guidance. 
Source: 
State Administration of Taxation, PRC, www.chinatax.gov.cn 
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Figure 2 Financial Revenue and Expenditure at Township Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
a. Shadow part of expenditure refers to extra expenditure of actual amount. 
 
 
Financial revenue pool 
 
Budgetary revenue 
 
Taxes 
Extrabudgetary 
revenue 
Funds/surcharges/fees 
Off-budgetary revenue 
Proceeds of land sale 
Financial expenditure package 
 
 
Budgetary 
expenditure 
 
Extrabudgetary 
expenditure 
 Soft constrain 
Hard constrain 
Upper jurisdiction 
 
 
Public 
expenditure 
Supporting local economic sector 
Tax refund/subsidy 
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2004 
 
Learning And Governance In Inter-Firm Relations 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-003-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1122 
 
Organisational Learning And Multinational Strategy 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-004-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1123 
 
Density And Strength Of Ties In Innovation Networks: A Competence And Governance View 
Bart Nooteboom and Victor A. Gilsing 
ERS-2004-005-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1124 
 
Innovation, learning and cluster dynamics 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-006-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1125 
 
Empirical Tests Of Optimal Cognitive Distance 
Stefan Wuyts, Massimo G. Colombo, Shantanu Dutta, and Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2004-007-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1126 
 
Entrepreneurship in Transition: Searching for governance in China’s new private sector 
Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2004-008-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1128 
 
Exploring Emotional Competence: Its effects on coping, social capital, and performance of salespeople 
Willem Verbeke, Frank Belschak and Richard P. Bagozzi 
ERS-2004-014-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1174 
 
The Impact of Business Ownership Change on Employee Relations: Buy-outs in the UK and the Netherlands 
Hans Bruining, Paul Boselie, Mike Wright and Nicolas Bacon 
ERS-2004-021-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1263 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
Towards a Dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare Economics 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-026-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1264 
 
The Three-Step Test-Interview (TSTI): An observational instrument for pretesting self-completion questionnaires  
Tony Hak, Kees van der Veer and Harrie Jansen 
ERS-2004-029-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1265 
 
Measuring the Knowledge Base of an Economy in terms of Triple-Helix Relations among ‘Technology, Organization, and 
Territory’ 
Loet Leydesdorff, Wilfred Dolfsma & Gerben van der Panne 
ERS-2004-034-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1300 
 
Paradoxes of Modernist Consumption – Reading Fashions 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-035-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1330 
 
Some Economics of Digital Content 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-036-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1331 
 
Learning Opportunities And Learning Behaviours Of Small Business Starters: Relations With Goal Achievement, Skill 
Development, And Satisfaction 
Marco van Gelderen, Lidewey van der Sluis & Paul Jansen 
ERS-2004-037-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1429 
 
The Process Of New Service Development – Issues Of Formalization And Appropriability 
Wilfred Dolfsma 
ERS-2004-051-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1445 
 
On And Off The Beaten Path: How Individuals Broker Knowledge Through Formal And Informal Networks 
Rick Aalbers, Wilfred Dolfsma & Otto Koppius 
ERS-2004-066-LIS/ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1549 
 
Governance Modes For Systemic Innovation. Service Development In Mobile Telecommunications 
J. van den Ende and F. Jaspers 
ERS-2004-067-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1539 
 
Performance Management: A model and research agenda 
Deanne N. den Hartog, Paul Boselie & Jaap Paauwe 
ERS-2004-068-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1779 
 
Human Resource Function Competencies In European Companies 
Paul Boselie and Jaap Paauwe 
ERS-2004-069-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1451 
 
Web-Based Organizing In Traditional Brick-And-Mortar Companies: The Impact On HR 
Jaap Paauwe, Elaine Farndale and Roger Williams 
ERS-2004-071-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1609 
Longevity in services: the case of the Dutch warehousing companies 1600-2000 
Hugo van Driel, Henk Volberda and Sjoerd Eikelboom 
ERS-2004-072-STR/ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1571 
 
Honing and Framing Ourselves (Extreme Subjectivity and Organizing) 
Sławomir Magala 
ERS-2004-076-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1583 
 
Cross-cultural compromises, multiculturalism and the actuality of unzipped Hofstede 
Sławomir Magala 
ERS-2004-078-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1584 
 
Perceptions about the ISO 9000 (2000) quality system standard revision and its value: The Dutch experience 
T. van der Wiele, J. Iwaarden, R. Williams and B. Dale 
ERS-2004-081-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1736 
 
Mystery shopping: A tool to develop insight into customer service provision 
M. Hesselink, J. van Iwaarden and T. van der Wiele 
ERS-2004-082-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1737 
 
A transparent role of information systems within business processes: A case study 
Menno Verboom, Jos van Iwaarden and Ton van der Wiele 
ERS-2004-083-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1738 
 
Central Unification versus Local Diversity: China’s Tax Regime, 1980s-2000s 
Ze Zhu and Barbara Krug 
ERS-2004-089-ORG 
 
The evolution of high-technology in China after 1978: Towards technological entrepreneurship 
M.J. Greeven 
ERS-2004-092-ORG 
 
Effects of multiple network ties Knowledge transfer and sharing in a network: The effects of multiple ties 
Irma Bogenrieder 
ERS-2004-093-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1781 
 
Multiple Inclusion and Community Networks 
Irma Bogenrieder and Peter van Baalen 
ERS-2004-094-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1782 
 
The Performance Of Team Start-Ups In The First Phases Of The Life Course  
Erik Stam And Veronique Schutjens 
ERS-2004-097-ORG 
